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Abstract—The Colombian government introduced a capacity 
market in order to promote the diversification in the energy 
matrix and protect users from high prices derived from dry 
seasonal events. Unfortunately, the flaws in the scarcity price 
definition- a mechanism that activates the capacity market 
obligation and sets a cap price for the spot market- have led into 
a market failure. Specifically, some generation plants have been 
forced to be unavailable because their variable costs are 
significantly higher than the scarcity price. This paper presents a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the Colombian Electricity 
system, with a particular emphasis on the definition of the 
scarcity price. Results present lessons and recommendations for 
policy makers based on the experience of the Colombian 
Electricity Market, highlighting the need of a new definition of 
the scarcity price and a different focus on the energy planning 
scheme.  
 
Index Terms—Capacity market, Colombian energy system, 
energy market, energy planning, spot market price 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
RIGGERED by a supply shortage provoked by an 
intense dry season, Colombian Electrical sector started its 
a deregulation process during mid-90’s [1]. A new Electrical 
market structure was introduced by the change in the 
regulatory framework. There were two main objectives of this 
reform: stabilize the market, and increase the system 
reliability. The market structure evolved from a regional 
vertical integrated companies owned by the state to an 
inclusion of the private sector and a division of companies into 
four main activities: generation, transmission, distribution, and 
retail [2].  
Electricity markets in South America gained broad 
experience of the process of deregulation [3]. In Colombia, the 
deregulation of electricity started in 1994, and the spot market 
initiated operations in July 1995, supported by Laws 142 and 
143. Despite some technological similarities with the Chilean 
electricity system, Colombia adapted the British model in the 
mid-1990s. Therefore, the Colombia’s wholesale electricity 
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market-Mercado de Energía Mayorista or MEM-is the only 
one in the region where pool prices are settled in a bidding 
process [4]. 
Four main transactions occur in the MEM:  i) Transactions 
in the spot market, where retailers buy the energy they need to 
meet the requirements of their demand, ii) Bilateral financial 
contracts between retailers and generators, which aim to 
reduce the agent’s exposure to market risk, iii) Auctions to 
allocate the Firm Energy Obligations -Obligaciones de 
Energía Firme or OEFs- under the scheme known as the 
Reliability Charge- Cargo por Confiabilidad or RC and iv) 
Other Services to provide ancillary power generation services, 
such as the automatic generation control (AGC) [5]. 
 
A. Allocation of Firm Energy Obligations in the MEM 
In terms of the Colombia’s installed capacity, 
approximately 64% of it comes from hydro-generation 
technologies and a minor proportion from thermal-generation 
plants (31%) [6]. This dependency on hydraulic resources 
causes that Colombia is particularly sensitive to a 
phenomenon known as “El Niño”, characterized by an 
intensive dry season with an approximate duration of 1 year 
[7]. As a result, it has been almost imperative for the electric 
energy sector to have sufficient thermal resources and hydro 
reservoirs with firm energy to replace hydro-generated energy 
in dry periods.  
Therefore, in 2006, the Colombian Commission for the 
Regulation of Energy and Gas (CREG) introduced a new 
scheme to guarantee the availability of sufficient capacity to 
meet peak demand during long dry seasons and to ensure the 
long-term reliability of the electricity supply in Colombia [8]. 
The scheme allocates Firm Energy Obligations to new and 
existing generation plants at price determined in competitive 
auctions. The OEFs are "option contracts" that commit 
generators to supply given amounts of energy at a 
predetermined Scarcity Price (SP), during scarcity situations. 
In return for agreeing to supply at the SP, during the 
commitment period, generators allocated with OEFs receive a 
fixed annual option fee for each kilowatt hour (kWh) 
contracted. This fee is called the Reliability Charge. It is paid 
by consumers in their electricity tariff and is determined in the 
auction in which the generator sold its firm energy. Generators 
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with OEFs receive the RC regardless of their actual dispatch 
and whether the fulfilment of their obligation is required or 
not.  
The main benefit of this charge is the contribution to 
recover a portion of the fixed costs for generation agents, 
especially for peaking power plants, which does not deliver 
energy to the grid frequently during regular weather 
conditions [8]. 
In case the energy generated is more than the obligation 
specified in the OEF, this additional energy will be paid or 
rewarded at the spot market price [9]. If generators cannot 
meet their OEFs, they pay a penalty, equal to the difference 
between the spot market price and the scarcity price on the 
OEF quantity not met in any hour. 
 
B. Remuneration of the OEF: definition of the Scarcity Price 
Scarcity pricing is a regulatory mechanism used by 
electrical markets to establish a cap market price sufficiently 
high during low system reliability periods, before the demand 
is not covered due to a shortage in supply [10]. Properly 
adjusted SP would help to incentivize: demand reduction, 
higher generation availability and additional energy imports. 
With a consistent increase of renewable generation in terms of 
installed capacity globally, Colombia appears as a suitable 
referent for current and future Electrical markets with a 
predominant renewable energy matrix and a possible exposure 
of scarcity of resources. In this sense, it is important to explain 
and recommend solutions for the current flaws of the scarcity 
price approach in the Colombian Electrical market. This 
experience can be valuable in order to establish more robust 
structures for markets with a high penetration of renewable 
generation.  
By definition, in Colombia the scarcity situation established 
when the Spot Market Price (SPM) surpasses the SP [9]. It is 
established by the CREG and updated on a monthly basis with 
the variation of the fuel operational costs of the most 
inefficient power plant, and other variable costs (OVCs) that 
generators have to pay to the system. Equations (1) to (6) 
show the methodology to calculate the SP [11]:   
 𝑆𝑃𝑚 = 𝑆𝑃𝑚
𝑓 + 𝑂𝑉𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑚−1 + 𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑚−1 
 
 (1) 
Where:  
𝑆𝑃𝑚: Scarcity Price for the month m in COP $/kWh 
 
Fuel Operational Cost of the Scarcity Price (𝑺𝑷𝒎
𝒇
): 
It is calculated in USD/MWh and then converted into COP 
$/kWh according to the Exchange Currency Rate (ECR) of the 
calculation day.  It is calculated using the New York Harbor 
Fuel Oil No. 6 and depends on the following values:  
 
𝑆𝑃𝑚
𝑓 = (𝑉𝐹𝑂𝑁6)(𝑆𝑃2014.01
𝑓 )(𝐸𝐶𝑅)                     (2) 
 
𝑉𝐹𝑂𝑁6 =
𝐴𝐹𝑂𝑁6 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 30 𝐷𝑎𝑦
𝐴𝐹𝑂𝑁62013.12
                     (3)     
         𝑆𝑃2014.01
𝑓 = (𝐻𝑅𝑀𝐵𝑇𝑈/𝑘𝑊ℎ)(𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑁6)   (4) 
 
Where:  
𝑉𝐹𝑂𝑁6: Monthly variation of New York Harbor Fuel Oil No. 
6 compared to December 2013 levels 
𝐴𝐹𝑂𝑁6 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 30 𝐷𝑎𝑦: Arithmetic Average of the previous 30 
days of the New York Harbor FON6 
𝐴𝐹𝑂𝑁62013.12: Arithmetic Average of the previous New York 
Harbor FON6 data of December 2013  
𝑆𝑃2014.01
𝑓 : January 2014 Fuel Operational Cost of Scarcity in 
COP $/kWh 
𝐻𝑅𝑀𝐵𝑇𝑈/𝑘𝑊ℎ: Heat Rate of the most inefficient power plant 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑁6: Fuel price (published by ECOPETROL- the largest 
and primary petroleum company in Colombia), plus a 1.5% to 
cover the transportation costs. This price is converted into 
USD/MBTU according to the ER of the last labour day of the 
month in which the calculation is made (It is certified by the 
National Bank) with a heating power of 0.15 MBTU/gallon. 
𝐸𝐶𝑅: Exchange Currency Rate (ECR) of the calculation day 
 
Other Variable Costs (𝑶𝑽𝑪𝑺𝑰𝑵𝒎−𝟏): 
They are related to the National interconnected system 
(SIN) for the month of interest minus one, in COP $/kWh, and 
depend on:  
 
𝑂𝑉𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑚−1 = (𝐸𝐸𝐶𝑚) + ( 𝐴𝐺𝐶𝑚−1) + (𝐹𝐴𝑍𝑁𝐼𝑚−1)
+ (𝐿𝑎𝑤99𝑚−1) 
 
(5) 
Where:  
EECm: Energy equivalent cost for the month of interest in 
COP $/kWh 
AGCm−1: Automatic gain control cost for the month of interest 
minus one, in COP $/kWh 
FAZNIm−1: Fund for the non-interconnected zones of the 
Country for the month of interest minus one, in COP $/kWh 
Law99m−1: Monetary contribution of the Law 99-1993 for the 
thermal plants for the month of interest minus one, in COP 
$/kWh 
 
Operation and Maintenance Costs (𝑶𝑴𝑪𝒎−𝟏): 
They are calculated for the month of interest minus one in 
COP $/kWh. This value depends on:  
 
𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑚−1 = 𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑒2006 (
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑚−1 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑒2006
) 
 
 
(6) 
Where: 
𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑒2006: Operation and Maintenance Costs for June 2006 
in COP $/kWh 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑒2006: Consumer price index for June 2006 in p.u 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑚−1: Consumer price index for the month of interest minus 
one in p.u. 
     
As an example, in September 2015, XM published the 
estimated value of the SP for October 2015 [12]. The 
calculation is based on the CREG resolution No. 070-2014.  
Table I shows a detailed explanation on the calculation of 
this value, using (1) to (6). The obtained value for the SP was 
about 0.0977 USD/kWh. 
TABLE I 
SCARCITY PRICE CALCULATION FOR OCTOBER 2015-EXAMPLE. SOURCE: 
ADAPTED FROM [12] 
Parameter Value 
𝑉𝐹𝑂𝑁6  0.0001 
𝑆𝑃2014.01
𝑓
  
0.0001 
𝐸𝐶𝑅   3096.98 
𝑆𝑃𝑚
𝑓
 0.0714 
𝐸𝐸𝐶𝑚  0.0164 
 𝐴𝐺𝐶𝑚−1  0.0037 
𝐹𝐴𝑍𝑁𝐼𝑚−1   
0.0004 
𝐿𝑎𝑤99𝑚−1  0.0009 
𝑂𝑉𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑚−1   0.0214 
𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑒2006  0.0034 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑚−1  0.0397 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑒2006  0.0280 
𝑂𝑀𝐶𝑚−1 0.0049 
𝑆𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑒𝑟_2015 ( USD/kWh) 0.0977 
 
Despite this scheme designed to provide reliability in the 
Colombia’s hydro-dominated electricity market, current 
electricity spot market prices in the MEM are increasing more 
than tenfold, setting an energy crisis in Colombia (See Fig.1). 
In consequence, the generation plants are paid with the SP 
which is lower than the variable cost of the generation plant 
that covers the demand on scarcity or peak periods-it means 
the plant with the highest variable cost. Thus, many generation 
plants are forced to be unavailable as a result of the 
extortionate costs of generating at a significantly higher cost 
than the SP.   
 
Fig. 1. Comparison between the Scarcity Price and the Spot Market Price in 
Colombia, 2015. Note: The prices were converted into USD using the same 
ECR of  SPt
f (adapted from [13]). 
In this sense, the current regulatory policy is not solving the 
problem of “missing money” (the amount of money per MW 
of capacity that a generator is missing in scarcity hours) [14]. 
This situation is a consequence of: First, one of the strongest 
“El Niño” periods that the country has faced, and Second, a 
failure in the electricity regulatory framework, regarding the 
definition of the SP.  
Considering the above evidence, we present an analysis of 
the Scarcity Price’ definition, its main flaws, the 
measurements already taken by the Colombian government, 
some recommendations to overcome the crisis , and the 
lessons learnt from the Colombian Electricity Market, 
applicable to other similar markets. The recommendations 
address the need to include non-conventional energies (not 
affected by the dry seasons) to provide firm energy, and a new 
definition of the SP,  considering its concept in terms of the 
generation plants costs and not in terms of the plants’ 
technical efficiency. These amendments could apply to other 
countries, which electricity generation relies mainly on hydro 
or have a similar energy markets and dry climate seasons. 
II. SCARCITY PRICING APPROACHES IN OTHER ELECTRICAL 
MARKETS 
The relevance and the mechanism which scarcity of 
generation resources is dealt with, vary depending on the 
market structure. These approaches were categorized into two 
main market structures: Energy only markets and Energy 
markets with capacity payments. 
 
A. Energy Only Markets 
By definition, in Energy only markets generators agents can 
only obtain revenues through spot market and ancillary 
services [15]. This market design leads to moderate prices 
during regular conditions and, occasional high prices during 
scarcity conditions. In this context, setting adequate scarcity 
price levels is crucial for a correct market performance. If the 
scarcity price is too high, excessive generating capacity will 
be built as a result, thus more power plants would not be 
operating during regular conditions, increasing the market 
exposure for the missing money problem. In contrast, if 
scarcity price is too low, there will be no incentive to build 
new generation capacity, increasing the possibility for future 
energy shortages [16]. 
Some scarcity pricing approaches had performed problems 
in Energy only markets. In the Electric Reliability Council of 
Texas (ERCOT) and Australia’s National Electrical Market 
(NEM), the SPOE is set by the highest bid price offer of 
generator agents, during normal conditions. In this process, the 
bids of large generator agents are mitigated; the SP is mainly 
established by small generator agents [17]. There are two main 
problems with this SPOE approach. Firstly, SPOE calculation 
relies only on some groups of generator agents to accurately 
predict the existence and the magnitude of a scarcity period, 
during normal conditions [18]. Second, according to [19], 
price bids of small-unmitigated generators agents vary widely 
under identical system condition, and as a result, there is a 
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B. Energy Markets with capacity payments 
Although scarcity situations are necessary less frequent in 
Energy market with an integration of capacity payments, they 
cannot be avoided completely. Scarcity pricing appears as a 
suitable approach for a better market performance [3]. The 
benefits of a proper Scarcity pricing approach are just not 
limited to send investment signal. Despite the design of the 
energy market, through a correct definition and method of 
SPOE calculation, resources can be allocated more efficiently 
and incentivise a higher demand response [20]. 
In the New England energy market (ISO-NE) the SPOE is 
defined as the maximum cost incurred to meet the reserve 
requirements- also known as Reserve Constraint Penalty 
Factor (RCPF)-, and the scarcity situation is defined when the 
SP is higher than RCPF. The RCPF set a cap for the sport 
market; if the RCPF is lower than the cost of meeting the 
reserve requirement level, these requirements will not be met 
(ISO-NE, 2009). Unlike the Colombian approach, during 
scarcity situations, in the ISO-NE, market scarcity revenues 
are subtracted from the capacity payments, avoiding extra 
revenues for agents. 
Despite some energy markets do not have a specific 
mechanism for scarcity pricing, they have established markets 
structures to deal with scarcity periods. For example, South 
Korea and Chile Energy markets have a capacity market based 
on availability. With a fast paced demand growth, energy 
security is a priority for these countries. Therefore, the 
capacity payment must be high enough to attract the 
investment in order to avoid energy rationing [3]. The former 
Colombian capacity market was designed based on the 
Chilean initial design, where capacity payments are made 
based on the installed capacity of the power plant, and the 
generator availability during peak demands months or capacity 
shortage situation [21]. Moreover, in the South Korea capacity 
market structure, the payment is different for base-load and 
peaking generation units. This payment is based on the gross 
capital and the O&M cost of a Coal and Gas generation unit, 
for base-load and peaking power plants, respectively [22]. 
III. FAILURES OF THE SCARCITY PRICE DEFINITION IN 
COLOMBIA 
There were two main objectives with the introduction of the 
SP regulation. First, avoid the peak prices that the demand has 
to pay in scarcity periods. Second, promote a good investment 
climate by a continuous remuneration to the Electrical 
Generators agents. It would guarantee the energy security of 
the country in terms of supply, especially due to a “gas crush”, 
motivating most of thermal generation power plants to change 
their fuel supply from gas to fuel oil based [9].  
This section analyses the reasons why the SP is not well 
defined and describes the basic rationale behind the problem. 
  
A. Main flaws in the definition of the Scarcity price 
The SP should be based on the variable cost of the peak 
power plant that attends the demand in the scarcity [23]. 
Instead, in the Colombian market the SP is defined based on 
the variable costs of the most “technically inefficient” plant, 
which is not always the plant that attends the peak demand. 
Other plants with higher technical efficiencies but also with 
higher variable costs are the ones who attend the peaks hours.  
With the latest spot and scarcity prices, the Colombian 
government took over a power generation agent, 
Termocandelaria (314 MW of installed capacity), because it 
was not generating energy due to the huge debt provoked by 
the difference between the SP and the variable generation cost 
of this agent [24]. 
This situation is particularly critical for other generation 
agents, and for the electricity market as a whole. There is a big 
probability that other generation agents could replicate the 
current situation of Termocandelaria, attempting directly to 
the Energy security of the country. Mainly, because “El Niño” 
is a seasonal event that impacts Colombia’s raining every 2 to 
6 years approximately [25] and also, because the current 
definition of the SP is heavily sensible to the international oil 
spot price. The SP’s formula has a strong correlation with oil 
prices (linked to the fuel oil No. 6 index). But the reality is 
that most Colombian thermal plants are backed by Fuel oil No. 
2, which is more expensive and it’s less correlated with oil. 
Therefore, the current scarcity price’s value comes from using 
the Fuel Oil No. 6 as a reference, because it’s much cheaper 
than the diesel used by plants (fuel oil No. 2).Changing the SP 
represents a dilemma. On one hand, the CREG argues that a 
change from FON6 to FON2 in the SP definition would 
represent an increase in the SP regardless the time of the year. 
Therefore during normal weather conditions, agents have an 
incentive to increase SPM because it would represent a 
potential higher revenue. This situation would be reflected in 
higher electricity bills for consumers. On the other hand, the 
cap price at which thermal plants can sell is not properly 
adjusted, increasing the probability of financial unavailability 
of these plants in scarcity periods, jeopardising the energy 
security of the country [26].  
 
B. Effects on the Market’s agents: Generators and 
Consumers 
During El Niño” period, the generation plants (especially 
thermal plants available in dry seasons) have increased their 
generation price and the final energy prices have also 
increased, affecting the final consumers’ economy.  
Since September 2015, with the Resolution No.178 of 2015, 
the CREG agreed to raise (for six months) the SP from COP 
$302 to COP $470. This measure applied only for thermal 
plants that generate with diesel, in order to overcome the 
scarcity period. Since then, the electricity tariff for residential 
consumers has increased by about 17.54 % [27]. Although 
consumers are protected by the SP, if it increases, the 
maximum price that the demand has to assume also increases.  
Nevertheless, the deadline for this measure is until April 28. 
According to the Association of the largest consumers of 
electric energy in Colombia (ASOENERGIA), they are not 
willing to accept any rise in the electricity tariff, after this 
deadline. The guild stresses the need to adopt measures to 
correct the structural problems affecting the power system 
[28]. 
From the point of view of the generators, due to the 
Millionaire losses they are facing because of the crisis, they 
are asking for a new agreement. According to [29], operators 
of the 12 thermal generation plants (which use gas and diesel) 
are willing to deliver their companies to the government, if by 
May 1, 2016 the CREG does not adjust the scarcity price to 
more than double. 
IV. ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT 
The Colombian government had taken some actions to 
avoid an energy crisis that could lead a possible blackout of 
the country in a certain hour of the day. Specifically, here we 
critique the rationale and effects of three measures taken by 
the Colombian government: the CREG regulation 172 and 178 
of 2015, the energy save program “Apagar Paga” and other 
measures also launched by the government. 
 
A. CREG resolution No. 172 of 2015 
Given the peaks prices of the SPM, almost 7 times greater 
than the SP (see Fig 1), the CREG introduced a cap price in 
the day-ahead bid process by publishing the CREG resolution 
No. 172 of 2015 [30]. The cap price is equal to the 75% of the 
first level of Incremental Operational Cost of Energy 
Blackout, (CRO1). Currently the CRO1 is equal to COP $ 
1191.07 [31]; therefore the cap price of the spot market of 
electricity in Colombia is COP $893.31. However this cap 
price only applies when the variable HSIN (Hydrology of the 
National Interconnected System) is lower than 90% or when 
the CREG determine that is necessary. The variable HSIN 
measure the amount of energy produced from hydraulic 
resources compared to the previous month. 
Despite the effectiveness of this measure, there are also 
some downsides. First the “missing money” problem is not 
solved. Thermal power plant with energy firm obligation will 
still be paid at the SP. Second; the 75% of the CRO1 is still 
lower than the cost of the peaking power plant. It means that 
some thermal power plants will not recover their variable cost 
even if they sell their energy at the SMP. Second, the time of 
the Penalty Exposure remains the same.  Although, the cap 
price for the day-ahead bid process reduces the magnitude of 
the penalty exposure of the agents, the SPM still higher than 
the SP level; therefore the time frame of the scarcity situation 
has not changed.  
Additionally, the price cap introduced in the regulation just 
depends on the level of the variable HSIN to be activated. This 
variable implies a comparison of at least two months of 
generation coming from hydro resources.  
 
B. CREG resolution No. 178 of 2015 
The CREG decided to establish a temporary floor for six 
month to the scarcity price.  Through the CREG resolution 
178 of 2015, the institution established that the SP would be 
the greater between, its monthly update and the SP of October 
2015 [32]. Moreover, for the generation agents that use fuel 
oil, the remuneration of the firm energy obligation will be 
approximately COP $470, which is 1.5 times higher than the 
current SP (approximately COP $302). 
This regulation also helps to reduce the time of penalty 
exposure of the agents. However, just like the CREG 
Resolution No. 172, the focus is more to reduce the magnitude 
of the penalty exposure and not the time. The resolution does 
not solve the “missing money” problem either.  It is true that 
in theory there is lower probability of the event where the 
SMP would be greater than the SP. Nevertheless, given the 
current water reservoir level and the El Niño/Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) forecast [33] and the recent SPM levels 
(See Fig. 1), it is highly possible that the SMP will be greater 
than the October SP level. 
Moreover, the resolution is a transitory measure and implies 
different market conditions for certain agents. Regardless the 
effectiveness of this resolution, the scope is only valid until 
May 2016, and according to the forecast, the dry season will 
remain until August of 2016.  
 
C. Energy save programme “Apagar paga” 
Driven by the current intense and long dry season, and the 
high possibility of an energy black out, the Colombian 
government launched an energy save programme called 
“Apagar paga” or “Turn off, pay off” (unofficial translation). 
The rationale is simple: promote the energy daily saving of at 
least 5% in order to avoid possible blackouts [34]. 
Behind the widely spread advertising camping through 
national TV or social media, the programme includes a set of 
penalty for the users that do not meet the energy savaging 
targets. Through the CREG Resolution No. 029 of 2016, for 
each extra kWh compared to the consumption in February of 
2015, the users have to pay an additional amount of COP 
$450. This particular feature of the programme has been 
polemical. On one hand, the government argues that there 
must be a price mechanism to incentive the energy saving in 
the country. On the other hand, normal users argue that the 
government did not take the correct measure and, now they 
have to be overcharge for a market failure problem [35], [36]. 
In addition, the programme was launched late. Since 
September of 2015, the system has been in a “scarcity 
situation” and the water reservoir level has dramatically 
dropped since then. In Contrast, the energy saving programme 
was launched in March of 2016, forcing to a dramatic change 
in behaviour. It is possible that the saving targets are met. 
However, in order to truly change people behaviour and move 
them towards a more efficient use of energy, it is necessary 
the implementation of long-term programmes [37], [38], not 
just an immediate implementation used as a “safety valve” 
measure. 
D. Other short-term measures 
Since it seems that “El Nino” period is testing the 
Colombia’s electricity framework, the government has had to 
enact these other temporary measures to preserve the viability 
of the system:  
1) Increasing the gas supply for thermal generation plants. 
However, current gas supply of the country is limited and the 
amount of gas required by the thermo-electric sector is too 
high. Therefore, it is expected that the regasification plant of 
liquid natural gas (LNG) will start operation by the end of 
2016, a few months later of the projected end of the dry 
season.  
2) Importing additional energy from Ecuador. Since 
December 2015 Colombia has imported energy from Ecuador, 
reaching to a peak in March 2016 of about 5.6 GWh. This 
measure has helped to reduce the stress of the system, 
although it represents a minor fraction of the country’s 
electricity demand (5522 GWh) [6], [39]. 
V. POTENTIAL MEASURES TO OVERCOME THE CRISIS IN THE 
LONG-TERM 
 
A. The need for a better energy planning 
El Niño has left in doubt the Colombia's hydroelectric 
capacity to meet the whole electricity demand, which is 
increasing as a result of the economic activity and the 
population growth. All governments in Latin America know 
that unusually dry periods appear, roughly once every 10 years 
[40] and therefore, there is no reason that justifies why 
Colombia has the possibility of going to an electrical collapse, 
because it was already known that “El Niño” would return. 
According to the Colombia's Generation and Transmission 
Expansion Plan 2006-2020, the electricity demand is expected 
to continue increasing by between 2.8 % and 3.8 % per year in 
the "Medium" scenario. This increase together with the 
phasing out of existing power plants (when they reach their 
end of lifetime), means that there will be a need for 
establishing new power generation facilities [8]. 
Hence, Colombia should consider nonconventional 
renewable sources of firm energy including wind, solar, 
biomass and geothermal, such as alternatives to thermal 
plants. Nevertheless, the promotion of an efficient mix of 
resources and the achievement of a firm energy market that 
provides reliable electricity at least cost, requires that all 
resources, including variable resources such as wind power, 
should be eligible to receive the same reliability payment, 
based upon the resources ‘ability to provide firm energy [40].  
The main benefits of this measure would be: 1) it leads to a 
more efficient mix of resources and reduces risk by 
establishing a more diversified portfolio instead of fossil fuels, 
which also could reduce electricity costs, 2) the long lead 
times required for large hydro and coal plants contrast with 
relatively limited externalities and flexibility offered by non-
conventional renewable sources of energy, 3) they do not 
depend on the fossil fuel’s price volatility, and  4) it reduces 
Colombia’s reliance on coal and other fossil fuels to generate 
electricity during dry periods, hence reducing Colombia’s 
emissions from fossil fuels and the negative effect on the 
environment and human health. 4) Likewise, with the current 
COP21 agreement there is an expected increase share of 
renewable energies, especially in the electricity sector [41]. A 
greater introduction of renewable technology in the generation 
park would help to achieve the international environmental 
target. 
In particular, the wind regime in Colombia is among the 
best in South America. The potential for wind power is 18 
GW, which is 900 times as much as the current capacity of 20 
MW [42]. Unfortunately, according to [39], the RC 
commitment only considers hydro and thermal power plants’ 
projects. From the 13 approved projects to entry the market 
until 2020, 69.23% of them corresponds to hydro power 
plants. It represents a total installed capacity of about 
3769.MW out of 4431.4 MW, the total projected energy firm 
that will be provided by the projects.  Thus, it means that none 
amendments are prevised for a future presence of “El Niño” 
period. 
In addition, in the last firm energy auction (in 2011), wind 
power was not eligible for firm energy payment. The main 
reason is the lack of information about the resource’s ability to 
supply firm energy. This is already done for hydro and thermal 
resources, but there is a need of an analogous methodology to 
estimate firm energy for variable resources [40].  
 
B. New definition of the Scarcity Price: Case Study 
Besides the above efforts made by the government, we 
define another possible proposal that could fix the current 
problems: Taking into account that the current SP does not 
reflect the actual situation of the market, it is proposed to use 
the heat rate and the fuel of the most expensive power plant in 
the market as a reference to calculate the variable cost (instead 
of the most inefficient one). The intention of this measure is to 
cover the variable costs of peak power plants and by this avoid 
a possible market collapse.  
We simulate the behaviour of the scarcity price by 
considering the variable cost of the most expensive plant in 
the market. It corresponds to the thermal plant 
“Termocandelaria”, which has a heat rate of 10 MBTU/kWh. 
Although it is the most expensive plant, it is not the most 
inefficient. In terms of efficiency (heat rate), the value varies 
between 6 MBTU/kWh and 12 MBTU/kWh and other thermal 
plants such as “Termoflores 2” (Diesel) and “Termocartagena 
2” (Fuel Oil), have values of about 12 MBTU/kWh [43]. 
Together with the above assumptions, we use Diesel (Fuel 
No.2 instead of Fuel No.6) as the operation fuel and the values 
for other external costs (such as some taxes and other legal 
deductions) remain the same. Also we considered the average 
Spot Market Price to calculate both, the time and magnitude of 
penalty exposure.  
We applied an analysis backwards in time, in a scope of one 
year (from April 2015 to March 2016), using (1) to (6). Fig. 2 
shows a new estimation of the scarcity price contrasted with 
the current scarcity price and the spot market price. 
 
Fig. 2. Proposal for a new definition of the SP: Case Study. Note: The 
Scarcity prices were converted into USD using the same  ECR of SPt
f. 
 
The new definition of the SP brings the following benefits: 
1) it solves the “missing money problem”, because the plants 
are paid according to the most expensive plant, therefore if the 
variable cost of the peak plants is covered, also it does for the 
rest of the plants. 2) It reduces the time of penalty exposure in 
60%, since the number of times the plants are exposed to 
market (because of the scarcity price) reduces from 196 times 
(using current SP) to 79 (using new definition of the SP) and 
3) it also reduces the magnitude of the penalty exposure in 
77%. It means the variation in price ($/kWh) during scarcity 
periods.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 “El Niño” period has put to test the Colombian Energy 
Capacity Market, and the regulatory framework as a 
whole.  The combined situation of high spot market prices and 
low scarcity prices has affected both, Generations agents and 
consumers. The current scarcity price definition is based on 
the cost of the most technical inefficient power plant in the 
market, not covering the variable cost of more efficient yet 
more expensive plants. Consequently, some generation agents 
have been financially unable to operate in the market due to 
the big debt acquired during the scarcity period. 
Despite the relative effectiveness of the measures taken by 
the government to mitigate the effects of the current energy 
crisis, we suggest three main amendments: redefining the 
scarcity price in terms of the plant with the highest variable 
costs of the market; redirecting the focus of the energy 
expansion plan through a more diversified energy matrix, 
centred in the inclusion of alternative renewable energy 
sources; and enabling long term energy efficiency 
programmes. Results show that the proposed scarcity price 
definition mitigates the agent’s penalty exposure in both 
dimensions: magnitude and time. However, since the new 
value of the scarcity price is higher compared to the current 
levels, the consumers could be potentially exposed to higher 
energy tariffs due to the increase of the spot market cap 
price.   Moreover, considering the country’s high potential of 
solar, wind and geothermal energy, these technologies could 
provide firm energy, but it requires mainly two conditions: 
First, more studies with accurate and updated data. Second, 
adjustments in the regulatory framework of the Colombian 
electricity market to support their inclusion. Furthermore, 
aligned with the measures mentioned above, long- term 
programmes should be implemented to truly change people's 
behaviour and move them towards to a more efficient use of 
energy. 
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